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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 15-2263 
_______________ 
 
EDWIN PATRICIO MORALES-REDROVAN, 
                 Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
        Respondent 
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A088-648-505) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Miriam K. Mills 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 20, 2016 
 
BEFORE: FISHER, CHAGARES AND COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  February 4, 2016) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
 COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Edwin P. Morales-Redrovan petitions for review of an order by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen.  We will deny the petition. 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
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I. 
 A citizen and national of Ecuador who entered the United States without 
inspection, Morales-Redrovan eventually retained Ephraim Tahir Mella, Esq. and his 
associates to represent him in his removal proceedings.  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 
denied Morales-Redrovan’s application for cancellation of removal because of a failure 
to demonstrate his presence in the United States for the requisite time period and to 
establish that his qualifying relatives would suffer extreme and exceptionally unusual 
hardship in the event that he were removed from the United States.  Relying on the 
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” requirement, the BIA dismissed his 
administrative appeal.  Represented by a different attorney, Morales-Redrovan 
unsuccessfully requested a one-year stay of removal.   
 Morales-Redrovan retained new counsel, who filed on his behalf a motion to 
reopen (as well as a request for a stay of removal) alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the part of Mella and his associates.  The BIA denied both motions.  The 
motion to reopen was denied “because the respondent has not demonstrated prejudice.”  
(AR3 (citing Fadiga v. Attorney General, 488 F.3d 142, 159 (3d Cir. 2007)).)  According 
to the BIA, in order to qualify for cancellation of removal, an alien must demonstrate that 
his or her removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his 
qualifying relatives.  This standard requires a showing of hardship substantially beyond 
                                                                                                                                                             
constitute binding precedent. 
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that which would ordinarily be faced by a qualifying relative upon the alien’s removal.  
Morales-Redrovan argued that his former counsel should have prepared him differently 
and asked him to provide additional evidence.  “However, the respondent has not 
submitted additional evidence demonstrating that his removal would prima facie satisfy 
the requirements of cancellation.  Therefore, he has not demonstrated prejudice.”  (Id.)  
II. 
 In order to prevail on a motion to reopen premised on the ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Morales-Redrovan had to show, inter alia, that he was prejudiced by his former 
counsel’s actions.1  See, e.g., Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 158-59.  “This Court determined that 
prejudice exists in the context of an immigration-based ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim where there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that an IJ would not have entered a 
removal order in proceedings ‘absent [former] counsel’s errors.’”  (Petitioner’s Brief at 
18 (quoting Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 158-59).)  A reasonable likelihood or probability consists 
of a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  See, e.g., Fadiga, 488 
F.3d at 160-61.  In turn, the Attorney General may cancel removal if, among other things, 
the alien establishes that his or her removal would result in exceptional and extremely 
unusual hardship to a qualifying relative.  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). 
                                                 
 1  We have jurisdiction over the petition for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  
A BIA order denying a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., 
Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006).  The BIA abuses its discretion if its 
ruling is “‘arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.’”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 
174 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
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 The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reopen.  Morales-
Redrovan argues that the BIA irrationally failed to find that he was prejudiced.  
According to him, it appears impossible not to conclude that there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a different outcome in the removal proceedings “if the Petitioner were 
prepared for trial, had been educated about evidence relevant to support his application 
for relief, and had the record in his case been reviewed by Attorney Mella or his 
subordinates in advance of Mr. Morales-Redrovan’s merits hearing.”  (Petitioner’s Brief 
at 24 (citing AR7).)  He also asserts that the BIA abused its discretion by claiming that 
the record did not demonstrate his prima facie eligibility to seek cancellation of removal.  
However, the BIA appropriately determined that Morales-Redrovan failed to establish a 
reasonable likelihood that he would have satisfied the “exceptional and extremely 
unusual hardship” prong in the absence of his former attorneys’ allegedly deficient 
performance.  As the BIA indicated, he did not submit (or even identify) the specific 
evidence that former counsel should have presented in the prior proceedings.  Without 
this evidence, Morales-Redrovan did not establish a reasonable likelihood of the agency 
finding that his removal would result in hardship “substantially beyond that which would 
ordinarily be faced by a qualifying relative upon the removal of the alien.”  (AR3 (citing 
In re Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001)).)      
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Morales-Redrovan’s petition for review.   
